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FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND PUBLIC ACCESS: 
TOWARD A THEORY OF PARTIAL 
REGULATION OF THE MASS MEDIA 
Lee C. Bollinger, Jr. *t 
During the past half century there have existed in this country 
two opposing constitutional traditions regarding the press. On the 
one hand, the Supreme Court has accorded the print media virtually 
complete constitutional protection from attempts by government to 
impose affirmative controls such as access regulation. On the other 
hand, the Court has held affirmative regulation of the broadcast 
media to be constitutionally permissible, and has even suggested that 
it may be constitutionally compelled. In interpreting the first 
amendment, the Court in one context has insisted on the historical 
right of the editor to be free from government scrutiny, but in the 
other it has minimized the news director's freedom to engage in 
"unlimited private censorship"1 and has exalted ,the "right of the 
public to receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral 
and other ideas and experiences."2 The opinions in each area stand 
apart, carefully preserved through a distinctive core of precedent, 
analysis and idiom. · 
The purpose of this article is to examine critically these decisions 
and to explore whether there is any rational basis for limiting to one 
sector of the media the legislature's power to impose access regula-
tion. 8 The article takes the position that the Court has pursued the 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1968, University of 
Oregon; J.D. 1971, Columbia University.-Ed. 
t I am grateful to my colleagues Vince Blasi, Richard Lempert, Don Regan, 
Terry Sandalow and Joe Vining and to Geoffrey Stone of the University of Chicago 
Law School for their helpful comments and criticisms in the preparation of this arti-
cle. I am especially indebted to my colleague Joe Sax and to Bo Burt of the Yale 
Law School for their instruction and guidance. 
1. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
2. 395 U.S. at 392. 
3. The term "access regulation" encompasses a variety of quite different forms 
of regulation. It can refer to a legal obligation to cover all points of view on any 
public issue as well as to a more modest rule that simply forbids discrimination in 
the acceptance of proffered advertisements. The underlying principle for the regu-
lation can vary along with its scope and impact on the press. It may be designed 
to protect reputations, to equalize opportunities of citizens to present their points of 
view on certain issues, or to maximize the amount of information available to the 
public. See B. ScHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS vs. PUBLIC ACCESS ch. 2 (1976). 
It is certainly not the purpose of this article to assert that all forms of access 
1 
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right path for the wrong reasons. There is a powerful rationality 
underlying the current decision to restrict regulatory authority to 
broadcasting, but it is not, as is commonly supposed, that broadcast-
ing is somehow different in principle from the print media and that 
it therefore is not deserving of equivalent first amendment treatment. 
As will be discussed in section I, the Court's attempt to distinguish 
broadcasting on the basis of its dependence on scarce resources 
(the electromagnetj.c spectrum) is unpersuasive; moreover, what-
ever validity the distinction may once have had is now being 
undercut by the advance of new technology in the form of cable 
television.4 Further, other possible points of distinction that 
may be raised, such as the broadcasting industry's high level of con-
centration and television's purported special impact on its viewers, 
do not presently justify the different first amendment treatment. 
For reasons that will be developed in section II, access regulation 
has been treated differently in the context of broadcasting than it 
has in that of the print media largely because we have long assumed 
that in some unpefined way broadcasting is, in fact, different. 
Rather than isolate broadcasting from our constitutional traditions, 
however, the Court should now acknowledge that for first amend-
ment purposes broadcasting is not fundamentally different from the 
print media. Such an admission would not compel the Court either 
to permit access regulation throughout the press or to disallow it 
entirely. There is, we shall see, an alternative solution. 
There has recently been a dramatic outpouring of articles ad-
dressing the issues associated with access regulation in the press. 5 
This literature demonstrates the dual constitutional nature of regula-
tion: It can be at once a valuable, indeed essential, means of 
redressing the serious inequality in speech opportunities that exists 
today within the mass media and a dangerous deviation from our his-
torical commitment to a free and unfettered press. The pr(!blem, 
therefore, is formulating a constitutional approach that captures the 
benefits of access regulation yet still minimizes its potential excesses. 
regulation are permissible; nor is it to specify which ought to be constitutionally sanc• 
tioned and which not. The assumption is made, primarily on the basis of the Court's 
holding in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), discussed i11 
text at notes 14-34 i11fra, that access regulation in some form is constitutionally ac-
ceptable. The purpose of the article is to address the theoretical problems raised by 
the next question: the extent to which the Constitution ought to be construed as 
permitting such regulation within the mass media. · 
4. See text at notes 112-15 infra. 
5. For an exhaustive listing of articles, see Lange, The Role of the Access Doc-
tri11e in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 
N.C. L. R.Ev. 1, 2 n.5 (1973). 
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These first amendment goals, it will be argued, can be achieved by 
permitting legislative access regulation but sharply restricting it to 
only one segment of the mass media, leaving the choice of the area 
of regulation to Congress. Without adequately explaining or per-
haps even comprehending its decisions, the Supreme Court has 
actually reached the constitutionally correct result in refusing to per-
mit government regulation of the print media, but has done this only 
because Congress had already chosen to regulate the broadcast 
media. 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS PORTMANTEAU 
In 197 4, when the Court considered the constitutionality of 
access regulation in the print media, 6 it was able to turn to a long-
standing constitutional tradition. Our society has generally been 
committed to the notion that, with a few narrow exceptions, the gov-
ernment should stay out of the business of overseeing editorial dis-
cretion in the press. 7 Our historical experience has given rise to a 
hearty skepticism of the ability of officials to decide, for example, 
what is "fair'' political debate. This skepticism recognizes the cor-
ruptibility of government and its seemingly innate desire to magnify 
whatever power over the press it might possess at a given time. 
The longstanding conception of the press as a "fourth branch" of 
government has seemed antithetical to the idea that the state should 
have power to affect its content. Even the most ardent advocates 
of access legislation have never sought to claim historical respectibil-
ity for their proposals; theirs is the argument of changed circumstan-
ces.8 
At issue in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo9 was a 
Florida statute requiring a newspaper in the state to publish without 
cost the reply of any candidate criticized in its columns.10 In a rela-
6. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
7. See, e.g., 2 z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT & MASS COMMUNICATIONS 477 (1947). 
8. See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 
HARv. L. REv. 1641 (1967). See also the Court's summary of the access proponents' 
arguments in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247-54 (1974). 
9. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). . 
10. The statute provided: 
104.38 Newspaper assailing candidate in an election; space for reply-If any 
newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for 
nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candidate with mal-
feasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or 
gives to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request 
of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make there-
to in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that 
calls for such reply, provided such reply does not take up more space than the 
matter replied to. Any person or firm failing to comply with the provisions of 
4 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:1 
tively brief and conclusory opinion, the Court surveyed prior print 
media cases and found implicit in them the proposition that "any 
... compulsion [by the government on newspapers] to publish that 
which 'reason' tells them should not be published is unconstitu-
tional."11 Access regulation violates that principle because it in-
trudes "into the function of editors"12 and because, as the Court 
assumed, although there was no evidence on the point, it also creates 
an impermissible risk of a chilling effect on news content.13 
What seems so remarkable about the unanimous Miami Herald 
opinion is the complete absence of any reference to the Court's 
unanimous decision five years earlier in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. FCC.14 In that case, the Court upheld two component regulations 
of the Federal Communications Commission's "fairness doctrine,"16 
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as 
provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083. 
FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973). Enacted in 1913, Law of June 6, 1913, ch. 6470, § 
12, 1913 Fla. Laws 274, the statute had slumbered peacefully until the 1970s, In 
the only other reported case, the statute was held unconstitutional. State v. News-
Journal Corp., 36 Fla. Supp. 164 (Volusia County Judge's Court, Fla. 1972). The 
Supreme Court noted that "in neither of the two suits, the instant action and the 1972 
action, has the Florida Attorney General defended the statute's constitutionality." 
418 U.S. at 247 n.7. 
11. 418 U.S. at 256. 
12. 418 U.S. at 258. As the Court said: 
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to 
limitations on the size of the paper, and content, and treatment of public issues 
and public officials--whether fair or unfair--constitutes the exercise of editorial 
control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regula-
tion of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment 
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time. 
418 U.S. at 258. 
13. The chilling effect was described in the following terms: 
Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that published news 
or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access statute, editors 
might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore, un-
der the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would 
be blunted or reduced. Government-enforced right of access inescapably "damp· 
ens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate," New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan . .•• 
418 U.S. at 257. 
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion in Miami Herald, in which Justice 
Rehnquist joined, expressing his understanding that the Court's decision indicated no 
"view upon the constitutionality of 'retraction' statutes affording plaintiffs able to 
prove defamatory falsehoods a statutory action to require publication of a retrac-
tion," 418 U.S. at 258. Justice White also filed a concurring opinion that stated: 
We have learned, and continue to learn, from what we view as the unhappy ex-
periences of other nations where government has been allowed to meddle in the 
internal editorial affairs of newspapers. Regardless of how beneficient-sounding 
the purposes of controlling the press might be, we prefer "the power of reason 
as applied through public discussion" and remain intensely skeptical about those 
measures that would allow government to insinuate itself into the editorial rooms 
of this Nation's press. ' 
418 U.S. at 259 (footnotes omitted). 
14. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
15. Developed over the years under the Commission's general power to promul-
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one of whic4, the so-called personal attack rule, 16 is almost identical 
in substance to the Florida statute declared unconstitutional in Miami 
gate regulations consistent with the "public interest," 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307 (1970), 
the doctrine requires broadcasters to provide adequate and fair coverage of opposing 
viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance. The substance of these obli-
gations was set forth in early Commission decisions. See Great Lakes Broadcasting 
Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929), revd. on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930); Trinity Methodist Church, South v. 
FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). However, 
the first official policy statement explaining the doctrines in detail was not issued by 
the Commission until 1949. See REPORT ON EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAsr LICEN-
SEES, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). Congressional endorsement of the doctrine followed 
ten years later. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, § "1, 73 Stat. 557, 
amending 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1958) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970)); see 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-82 (1969). 
Another well-known regulation of this genre is the equal time rule. A feature 
of the statutory scheme since the beginning, the rule provides that a broadcaster who 
permits a political candidate to "use" his station must "afford equal opportunities to 
all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station." 47 
U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. V 1975). 
The broadcast media has, of course, been subject to extensive legal restraints be-
yond access regulation since the passage of the Radio Act in 1927. Radio Act of 
1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162. Congress acted in that year in response to a massive 
problem of signal interference, which threatened the life of the new technology, and 
"under the spur of a widespread fear that in the absence of governmental control the 
public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcas~ing 
field." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940). Within the 
space of about a decade, radio had grown in popularity and social impoi:tance to such 
an extent that intervention was necessary to allocate the small number of available 
frequencies. Congress delegated this responsibility to the Federal Radio Commis-
sion, vesting it with authority to issue licenses and promulgate regulations consistent 
with the public "convenience, interest, or necessity." Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 
§ 4, 44 Stat. 1163. The Federal Communications Act was passed in 1934, but aside 
from renaming the Commission, the essential nature of radio regulation was left un-
changed. Communications Act of 1934, Tit. III, ch. 56, 48 Stat. 1081, as amended by 
47 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1970). The professed object of the new enterprise remained 
to "make available, so far as possible, to alJ the people of the United States a rapid, 
efficient, Nation-wide wire and radio communications service." 47 U.S.C. § 
151 (1970). . 
16. The regulation covering personal attacks and political editorials provides as 
follows: 
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public 
importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like per-
sonal qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a rea-
sonable time and in no event later than one week after the attack, transmit to 
the person or group attacked ( 1) notification of the date, time and identification 
of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or 
tape is not available) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity 
to respond over the licensee's facilities. 
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be applicable 
(1) to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (2) to personal at-
tacks which are made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokes-
men, or those associated with the candidates in the campaign; and (3) to bona 
fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of a bona 
fide news event (including commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing 
programs, but the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall be applicable 
to editorials of the licensee). 
(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii) opposes a legally 
qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee shall within 24 hours after the edi-
torial, transmit to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate or candidates for 
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Herald. That omission, however, is no more surprising than the 
absence of any discussion in Red Lion of the cases in which the Court 
expressed great concern about the risks attending government regu-
lation of the print media. 
Instead of scrutinizing government regulation of broadcasting in 
light of the print media cases and our traditional reservations about . 
government oversight of the press, the Court in Red Lion regarded 
broadcasting as a "unique medium"17 that needed a distinctive first 
amendment analysis. Specifically, the Court plunged ahead to assert 
for the first time the incompatibility of a concentrated medium, 
which is how it characterized broadcasting, with the first amendment 
goals expressed in the Holmesian metaphor of the "market-place of 
ideas."18 The marketplace theme as developed in Red Lion states 
that when, as now, the channels of communication are effectively 
controlled by a few interests, there is the risk that many important 
voices will be excluded and that, as a consequence, the public will 
be seriously hampered in its efforts to conduct its affairs wisely. Un-
less the government intervenes to insure the widespread availability 
of opportunities for expression within the mass media, the objectives 
of the first amendment may be frustrated. Thus, the Court reasoned 
in a frequently quoted passage: 
Nor can we say that it is inconsistent with the First Amendment 
goal of producing an informed public capable of conducting its own 
affairs to require a broadcaster to permit answers to personal attacks 
occurring in the course of discussing controversial issues, or to re-
quire that the political opponents of those endorsed by the station be 
given a chance to communicate with the public. Otherwise, station 
owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make 
time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their 
views on public issues, people and candidates, and to, permit on the 
air only those with whom they agreed. There is no sanctuary in the 
First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a 
medium not open to all.19 
These constitutional principles are an elaboration of the "scarcity 
the same office or (ii) the candidate opposed in the editorial (1) notification 
of the date and the time of the editorial; (2) a script or tape of the editorial; 
and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity for a candidate or a spokesman 
of the candidate to respond over the licensee's facilities: Provided, however, 
That where such editorials are broadcast within 72 hours prior to the day of the 
election, the licensee shall comply with the provisions of this paragraph suffi-
ciently far in advance of the broadcast to enable the candidate or candidates to 
have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response and to present it in a timely 
fashion. 
47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1973). 
17. 395 U.S. at 390. 
18. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
19. 395 U.S. at 392. 
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doctrine" first articulated in National Broadcasting Co. v. United 
States (NBCJ,20 in which Justice Frankfurter argued that because 
radio was "inherently . . . not available to all" it was "unique" and 
therefore "subject to governmental regulation."21 Needless to say, 
the opinion in Red Lion reflects a far different attitude toward the 
relationship between editors and government than that in Miami 
Herald. 
20. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The broadcasters in NBC challenged on statutory and 
constitutional grounds the so-called chain broadcasting regulations, designed by the 
Commission to regulate various aspects of a network's relationship with its affiliated 
stations. See 319 U.S. at 198-209. 
21. 319 U.S. at 226. Justice Frankfurter's discussion of the constitutional issues 
(he disposed of the statutory claims early in the opinion, 319 U.S. at 215-26) was 
to become the classic statement of the justification for government regulation in 
broadcasting: 
We come, finally, to an appeal to the First Amendment. The regulations, 
even if valid in all other respects, must fall because they abridge, say the appel-
lants, their right of free speech. If that be so, it would follow that every person 
whose application for a license to operate a station is denied by the Commission 
is thereby denied his constitutional right of free speech. Freedom of utterance 
is abridged to many who wish to use the limited facilities of radio. Unlike other 
modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique 
characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject 
to governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish 
to use it must be denied. · 
319 U.S. at 226-27. The focus, ultimately, was to be on the public interest served 
by licensing: 
The question here is simply whether the Commission, by announcing that it will 
refuse licenses to persons who engage in specified network practices • • • is 
thereby denying such persons the constitutional right of free speech. The right 
of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of radio 
without a license. The licensing system established by Congress in the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 was a proper exercise of its power over commerce. The 
standard it provided for the licensing of stations was the "public interest, conven-
ience, or necessity." Denial of a station license on that ground, if valid under 
the Act, is not a denial of free speech. 
319 U.S. at 226-27. 
Justice Frankfurter's analysis was hardly satisfying. It addressed the question 
whether the government could constitutionally deny a license to any applicant, an is-
sue not raised by the broadcasters, and held that the scarcity of a major resource used 
in broadcasting (the electromagnetic spectrum), which is not sufficiently plentiful to 
supply all who wish to broadcast, justified a governmental licensing scheme. Justice 
Frankfurter completely failed to address other crucial questions: Why was the 
method chosen for allocation of licenses constitutional? If the method were consti-
tutional, what limitations did the first amendment impose on its administration? 
And, why were these regulations not subject to those limitations? Perhaps the kind-
est comment on Justice Frankfurter's treatment of the constitutional issue was made 
by Professor Kalven, who observed that the "passage catches a great judge at an un-
impressive moment." Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 
10 J. LAW & EcoN. 15, 43 (1967). See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION 657 (1970). Nevertheless, the physical scarcity thesis became the 
principal rationale for distinguishing broadcasting from the print media and the basis 
for regulation in the "public interest," see 2 Z. CliAFBB, supra note 7, at 638, although 
other rationales occasionally surfaced. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 
v. Democratic Natl. Comm. (CBS), 412 U.S. 94, 101, 126 (1973) (referring to "pub-
lic domain" thesis that broadcasters could be regulated because they used the "pub-
licly owned" airspace). 
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A comparison of Red Lion and Miami Herald, however, reveals 
more than different first amendment motifs. The tone and attitude 
manifested in these cases toward the proper limits of governmental 
intervention are entirely dissimilar. In Miami Herald, the Court 
clearly and firmly opposed any further experimentation with access 
legislation, while in Red Lion, the Court acted as if it were reviewing 
a decision of an administrative agency where great weight had to be 
paid to the agency's expertise in dealing with a "new technology of 
communication." Illustratively, the Court in Red Lion responded to 
the broadcasters' claim that the right-of-reply regulations created an 
impermissible chilling effect by displaying deference toward the 
FCC's determination that the possibility of such an effect was "at 
best speculaµve."22 This approach is in sharp contrast to the Court's 
later assertion in Miami Herald that access regulation "inescapably 
'dampens th~ vigor and limits the variety of public debate.' "23 
An even more significant example of the Court's leniency 
towards governmental experimentation with access regulation in 
broadcasting is the Court's response in Red Lion to the broadcasters' 
claim that, !although there once might have been technological 
scarcity, the situation had changed significantly. 24 The broadcasters' 
argument was hardly frivolous. The development of the UHF (ultra 
high frequency) portion of the spectrum had greatly expanded the 
total number of available channels, and when the Court considered 
the issue, a significant number were ( and continue to be) unused. 2G 
22. See 395 U.S. at 393. 
23. 418 U.S. at 257, quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
279 (1964). 
24. 395 U.S. at 396. 
25. In a footnote, the Court set forth the following table that had been prepared 
by the Commission as of August 31, 1968: 
COMMERCIAL 
Channels 
on the Air, 
Channels Authorized, or 
Allocated Applied for 
VHF UHF. VHF UHF 
Market Areas 
Top 10 ____ 40 45 40 44 
Top 50 157 163 157 136 
Top 100 264 297 264 213 
NONCOMMERCIAL 
Channels 
Market Areas 
Channels 
Allocated 
VHF UHF 
Top 10 ____ 7 17 
Top 50 ____ 21 79 
Top 100 ___ 35 138 
1968 FCC Annual Report 132-35. 
395 U.S. at 398 n.25. 
on the Air, 
Authorized, or 
Applied for 
VHF UHF 
7 16 
20 47 
34 69 
Available 
Channels 
VHF UHF 
0 1 
0 27 
0 84 
Available 
Channels 
VHF UHF 
0 1 
1 32 
1 69 
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On several occasions, moreover, the FCC had denied a license to 
a single applicant for a particular VHF (very 'high frequency) 
frequency because the applicant had failed to meet the Commission's 
programming requirements or because granting the license would 
have had an adverse economic impact on existing stations in the com-
munity. 26 In light of these facts, the broadcasters surely might have 
expected a Court concerned with freedom of the press to limit care-
fully the government's exercise of regulation to those situations con-
sistent with the constitutional rationale adopted in NBC-that is, to 
instances where there was truly "physical scarcity." 
This was not, however, the Red Lion Court's focus. Instead, the 
Court was primarily concerned with society's interest in establish-
ing priorities for use of new technologies and was willing to affirm 
regulation that may not have been needed at that time to promote 
traditional first amendment interests: 
The rapidity with which technological advances succeed one an-
other to create more efficient use of spectrum space on the one hand, 
and to create new uses for that space by ever growing numbers of 
people on the other, makes it unwise to speculate on the future alloca-
tion of that space. It is enough to say that the resource is one of 
considerable and growing importance whose scarcity impelled its reg-
ulation by an agency authorized by Congress. Nothing in this record, 
or in our -own researches, convinces us that the resource is no longer 
one for which there are more immediate and potential uses than can 
be accommodated, and for which wise planning is essential. 27 
Instability would result, the Court surmised, if the Commission could 
only intervene when the demand suddenly exceeded the supply of 
, frequencies in a community. In any event, it was thought, existing 
broadcasters had obtained such "advantages" by virtue of govern-
ment selection that "[s]ome present possibility for new entry by 
competing stations is not enough, in itself, to render unconstitutional 
the Government's effort to assure that a broadcaster's programming 
ranges widely enough to serve the public interest."28 
The point of this comparative analysis of Red Lion and Miami 
Herald can be clarified by juxtaposing what the Court both articu-
lated and failed to articulate in these decisions. The Court in Red 
Lion introduced a new principle into our first amendment jurispru-
dence. Essentially, that principle provides that when only a few 
interests control a major avenue of communication, those able to 
speak can be forced by the government to share. The initial logic 
26. See, e.g., Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
27. 395 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added). 
28. 395 U.S. at 400. 
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supporting the principle is clear: If it is accepted that a principal 
objective of the first amendment is to assure the widespread dissemi-
nation of various points of view, then any serious constriction of the 
available methods of communication would seem to justify some 
remedial action. Applying this logic to broadcasting, the Court 
found that concentration there justified action and that access regu-
lation is an appropriate legislative response. 
Equally important, on the other hand, is what the Court has failed 
to say in its decisions on access regulation. It is clear that the Court 
has not made explicit just what is so "unique" about the broadcast 
media that justifies legislative action impermissible in the newspaper 
context. It is doubtful that the so-called scarcity rationale articulated 
in NBC and Red Lion provides an explanation. Certainly the 
scarcity rationale explains why Congress was justified in devising an 
allocation scheme to prevent the overcrowding of broadcasting fre-
quencies. It may also serve to explain in part why the television 
industry is so concentrated. 29 The scarcity rationale does not, how-
ever, explain why what appears to be a similar phenomenon of 
natural monopolization within the newspaper industry does not con-
stitute an equally appropriate occasion for access regulation. 30 A 
29. See note 30 infra. 
30. See, e.g., B. ScHMIDT, supra note 3, at ch. 4. It is difficult to compare effec-
tively the extent of concentration in the broadcast and newspaper media. There are 
8,760 broadcast stations, compared. with 1,733 English language daily newspapers. 
See BROADCASTING, YEARBOOK 1975, at A-2; NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATION, 
1975 WORLD ALMANAC 303 (1974). However, most of the broadcast outlets are ra-
dio stations (7,807), leaving 954 television stations (513 Commercial VHF, 198 com-
mercial UHF, 95 noncommercial VHF and 147 noncommercial UHF). BROADCAST-
ING, YEARBOOK 1975, at A-2. Other data, however, complicate the picture. A rela-
tively recent assessment of the effects of media concentration noted: 
From 1945 to 1970, the number of U.S. cities with competitive daily newspapers 
fell from 117 to 63, while the total number of dailies remained nearly constant. 
By 1973, only 55 competitive newspaper cities remained., and only the very larg• 
est cities such as New York and Chicago supported competitive morning or 
evening dailies. Moreover, 20 of the 55 cities retain daily newspaper competi• 
tion only through joint operating agreements by which two newspapers share 
printing and business operations. 
W. BAER, H. GELLER, J. GRUNDFEST, K. POSSNER, CONCENTRATION OF MASS MEDIA 
OWNERSHIP: ASSESSING THE STATE OF CuRRENT KNOWLEDGE 35 (1974) (footnotes 
omitted). At a later point, the study further compares the national concentration of 
ownership in television and newspapers: "There are nearly 400 television station 
owners, but the fifty largest group owners serve 74 percent of the total daily audience. 
Among the more than 1,000 newspaper publishers, the fifty largest control 58 percent 
of all circulation." Id. at 57-58. 
The point here is not to establish a methodology for measuring comparatively the 
risks of concentration in the electronic and print media but rather to support the 
less controversial proposition that the evils of concentration-to the extent that they 
exist-would appear to be a problem within the newspaper context as well as the 
broadcast media. See Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations 
on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 156-59 
(1967). 
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difference in the cause of concentration-the exhaustion of a physi-
cal element necessary for communication in broadcasting as con-
trasted with the economic constraints on the number ·of possible 
competitors in the print media-would seem far less relevant from 
a first amendment standpoint than the fact of concentration itself. 
Thus, it might be argued that a person "attacked" in the Washington 
Post, or one who holds a different viewpoint than that expressed in 
that newspaper, is able to publish a pamphlet or his own "news-
paper" in response. But does this have any more appeal ·than a simi-
lar argument with respect to the Columbia Broadcasting System? 
It is true, of course, that a person with the requisite capital 
and inclination could, theoretically, always establish his own news-
paper if the local print media refused to publish his point of view, 
whereas it is highly unlikely that he could establish his own broad-
cast station if the local stations refused to cover his viewpoint. But 
this seems a slim basis on which to predicate such dramatically dif-
ferent constitutional treatment. Even if we assume greater ease in 
entering the print media, however, the question remains why the 
purported openness of the newspaper market should not be consid-
ered an important factor in assessing the significance of concentration 
in the broadcast media. Why, this analysis asks, did the Court in 
Red Lion treat the broadcast media as separate and discrete? Why 
did the Court, in an exercise similar to defining the "relevant 
market" in an antitrust case, narrow its focus to a particular segment 
of the mass media? Why did the Court not say that, so long as people 
can gain access somewhere within the mass media, there is no need 
for legislative action in any concentrated branch? The treatment of 
the ·broadcast media as discrete constitutes at least implicit acknowl-
edgement that the newspaper and other major print media are also 
highly restricted. If anyone could set up a major newspaper, would 
we really care if entry into the broadcast media was physically pre-
cluded? Or is the explanation somehow hinged to the nature of the 
regulatory scheme itself? 
The fact is that the Court has never sought to answer the difficult 
questions relating to the scope of the new constitutional principle. 31 
31. In a concluding footnote to the Red Lion opinion, the Court seemed to leave 
open the question whether the cause of concentration could ever be important: 
We need not deal with the argument that even if there is no longer a tech-
nological scarcity of frequencies limiting the number of broadcasters, there nev-
ertheless is an economic scarcity in the sense that the Commission could or does 
limit entry to the broadcasting market on economic grounds and license no more 
stations than the market will support. Hence, it is said, the fairness doctrine 
or its equivalent is essential to satisfy the claims of those excluded and of the 
public generally. A related argument, which we also put aside, is that quite 
apart from scarcity of frequencies, technological or economic, Congress does not 
12 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 7S:1 
The Court in Miami Herald acknowledged the argument that the in-
creased concentration within the newspaper industry constituted 
changed circumstances justifying affirmative governmental action but 
offered little in the way of satisfactory explanation. 32 Instead of 
exploring the relevance for the print media of the new principle 
developed in broadcasting, the Court merely reiterated the opposing, 
more traditional, principle that the government cannot tell editors 
what to publish. 33 It thus created a paradox, leaving the new prin-
ciple unscathed while preserving tradition. 84 
There thus now exists an unresolved tension between the con-
stitutional themes that have been drawn in the electronic and print 
media. As will be shown below, however, this does not mean that 
the tension cannot be resolved. 
II. TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY 
a law of inherent opposites, Of essential unity, is as pleasant 
as port .... 35 
The preceding section has attempted to demonstrate the unper-
suasiveness of the scarcity argument: Concentration is not unique 
to broadcasting and, in any case, the scarcity rationale has no appli-
cation to the cable technology36 where questions of access regulation 
are now brewing. Thus, even for those who have embraced it, the 
rationale is at best a short-term answer to what appears to be a long-
term problem. It is, therefore, now important to inquire whether 
there is any basis other than the scarcity doctrine for denying Con-
abridge freedom of speech or press by legislation directly or indirectly multiply-
ing the voices and views presented to the public through time sharing, fairness 
doctrines, or other devices which limit or dissipate the power of those who sit 
astride the channels of communication with the general public. 
39S U.S. at 401 n.28. 
32. 418 U.S. at 249-Sl. 
33. 418 U.S. at 258. 
34. One possible key to understanding Miami Herald might lie in the fact that 
the case involved a state attempt to impose access regulation on the press. It is pos-
sible, in other words, that the Court was moved to reach the result it did because 
it thought it would be too difficult to supervise regulatory experiments in SO states 
or that, for somewhat different reasons, this area of access regulation has become a 
matter exclusively of federal concern. For reasons that will be developed later, I be-
lieve that Miami Herald would have-and should have-been decided the same way 
if the regulations had been of federal origin. See text at notes 82-102 infra. That 
is not to say, however, that in circumstances where it is thought to be constitutionally 
appropriate to impose access regulation, Congress, in contrast to the states, would not 
have a special role to play in seeking to implement first amendment goals. Cf. Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) . 
. 3S. w. STEVENS, Connoisseur of Chaos, in COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE 
STEVENS 167 (1954). 
36. See note 112 infra. 
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gress the authority to extend access regulation beyond the already-
regulated electronic media. 
A. Comparison of the Electronic and Print Media 
The customary approach to the problem of disparate treatment 
of the electronic and print media has been to line them up side by 
side and see whether there are any differences between ·them that 
justify the result. It is implicitly assumed that if broadcasting cannot 
be distinguished from the print media, it must be treated similarly; 
if it is different, then it can be regulated to the extent that the dif-
ferences allow. The scarcity analysis, which focuses exclusively on 
broadcasting without making express comparisons and which argues 
that this branch of the communications media possesses a "unique" 
characteristic of concentration, is one such attempt to isolate a dif-
ference that would permit separate treatment. Although that differ-
ence apparently should fail the test of materiality, there may be more 
appropriate distinctions, such as a possible qualitative difference 
of degree in levels of concentration and a reputed special impact of 
television on its viewers. 
Irrespective of the cause of concentration within each branch of 
the media, television is in some respects more concentrated than any 
segment of the print media. There are fewer television stations, for 
example, than daily newpapers, 37 but even more significantly, f~wer in-
terests control the content of television broadcasting than is true within 
the newspaper industry. In television an oligopoly of three networks 
commands the attention of a vast percentage of the television audi-
ence, while in newspapers the concentration is more dispersed, with 
monopolization on a local, regional, or more limited, national 
level.88 
This might not be regarded as very significant if few people 
watched television, but, of course, the situation is quite the reverse. 
In many important respects, television is today the most pervasive 
medium of communications in our society. Not only does virtually 
everyone have access to a television set, but more people watch it, even 
for purposes of obtaining news, and for longer periods, than read the 
publications of the print media. 39 In addition, television is frequently 
considered to have a "special impact" on its audience. Thus, many 
37. See note 30 supra. 
38. See Barrow, Program Regulation in Cable TV: Fostering Debate in a Co-
hesive Audience, 61 VA. L. REv. 515, 530 (1975). 
39. See E. EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE 9 (1973); B. ScHMIDT, supra note 
3, at 120. 
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courts and commentators believe television is today the dominant 
means of influencing public opinion, not only because more people 
watch it than read newspapers, but also because it possesses some un-
defined and unquantifiable, but nevertheless unique, capacity to shape 
the opinions of the viewers in ways unrelated to the merits of the argu-
ments presented.40 The television medium, it is also said, offers the 
opportunity to thrust information and ideas onto the audience. 
Unlike printed publications, which can be avoided by "averting 
the eyes,"41 television provides the opportunity to force extraneous 
messages onto audiences gathered for other purposes. 42 This 
medium, in short, may be the preeminant forum for the discussion 
of ideas and viewpoints in the society and it may offer opportunities 
to persuade that cannot be matched elsewhere within the system of 
expression. The greater concentration of power in television, there-
fore, may arguably represent more serious social and first amend-
ment problems than the situation in the print media. 43 
This line of argument, promising though it may seem, contains 
several serious problems. First, the analysis fails to explain why the 
current level of concentration in newspapers, even assuming that it 
is not as high as that in television, is not sufficiently troublesome by 
itself to justify governmental intervention. The monopoly status of so 
many of our community newspapers does not present a happy pros-
pect for the first amendment. Beyond some point, the level of con-
centration seems to become irrelevant to constitutional doctrine. 
The question to be asked, therefore, is not whether broadcasting is 
more concentrated than the print media, but whether both have 
passed beyond the point of safety for first amendment purposes. 
It seems reasonable to believe that, if concentration in broadcast-
ing has passed an acceptable level, concentration in newspapers has 
also reached a similar level. Are the abuses of journalistic power and 
one-sidedness more likely in the electronic than in the print media? 
40. See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 n.77 (D.C. Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). 
41. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 16, 21 (1971). 
42. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 16, 21 (1971). The Supreme Court has 
also noted the "captive" nature of the broadcast audience. See Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127-28 (1973). 
43. Cf. L. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 29 ( 1973): 
Almost as difficult as conceiving of cumulative trends is imagining the effects 
of scale. Barely 100,000 television receivers were in use in the United States 
in 1948. In the next year there were a million. A decade later there were 50 
million. The social and psychological consequences of such phenomenal growth 
are hard even to contemplate, let alone predict. Indeed, in the case of television 
these effects are still a matter of debate, and apparently adequate research tools 
for measuring or evaluating them do not yet exist. 
November 1976] Freedom of the Press and Public Access 15 
Is the access for new ideas more problematical in the broadcast than 
in the print media? Certainly there is no empirical evidence sup-
porting affirmative answers to these questions, and their validity as 
intuitive propositions is subject to doubt. Television is character-
ized more by its placidity than by its politicization.44 Moreover, 
newspapers are a primary source of news for television, and the print 
media may instead prove to be the first line of defense against new 
ideas. 45 Further, it is significant that in television there -are three 
independently owned national networks vying for viewers, a potenti-
ally important systemic check against distortion that is lacking in 
communities with only a single newspaper. Finally, the major net-
works do control the content of prime-time television, but the major 
wire services, such as Associated Press and United Press Interna-
tional, similarly control much of the national news reported in news-
papers throughout the country, although perhaps to a somewhat 
lesser degree. 
Even more problematical, however, is the alleged special impact 
of television. Quite apart from any natural suspicions concern-
ing the validity of the claim, given the frequency with which it seems 
to confront each new medium of communications, 46 the impact thesis 
is a dangerously amorphous justification for regulation. It provides no 
clear limits to official authority and invites censorship as well as affir-
mative regulation. Further, in so far as the thesis rests upon the prem-
ise that regulation is more acceptable the greater the audience and 
the impact, it seems inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the 
first amendment, which presumably is to protect effective as well as 
ineffective speech. A comparison of the gross audience figures is, in 
any event, a clumsy basis on which to gauge the differing effects of 
various media on the formation of public opinion or policy. Use of 
such data alone completely ignores the insights of political scientists 
into the complexity of cognition and decision-making.47 Finally, 
there is simply no evidence at the present time to support the propo-
sition that television shapes attitudes and ideas in ways so unprece-
dented as to require urgent remedial regulation. Thus, until more 
evidence exists to support the theory, or perhaps until a much wider 
consensus is formed in its support, it seems wise to avoid relying on 
the special impact theory. 
44. See generally E. EPSTEIN, supra note 39. 
45. See generally id. 
46. See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43- (1961) (motion pic-
tures). 
41. See generally R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CON-
FLICT AND CoNSENT (1967). 
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This discussion does not mean to suggest that the line of analysis 
focusing on the potential differences between television and news-
papers and magazines is unworthy of further investigation. On the 
contrary, the issues raised are highly important and should continue 
to command attention. On the whole, however, the arguments 
presently contain too many doubtful underlying assumptions to 
support a conclusion that the media are fundamentally different. 
Differences indeed exist, but they are either too insignificant to 
justify momentous distinctions in treatment under the first amend-
ment or too broad and vacuous to be persuasive. We must, there-
fore, conclude that they are the same. 48 
It is at this point that conventional thinking about broadcast regu-
lation largely stops. Once it is determined that the broadcast and 
print media are constitutionally indistinguishable, then it is concluded 
that the Court's theory of access regulation is without rational 
foundation and should be discarded at the earliest opportunity.40 
Such a conclusion possesses a certain legalistic appeal, but it also may 
be an oversimplification. The very weakness of the scarcity ration-
ale suggests that there is something more here than first meets the 
eye. The dual treatment of the press has been so long accepted, 
even by persons known for their sensitivity to first amendment 
values, 50 that the scarcity rationale may in fact be a convenient legal 
fiction covering more subtle and important considerations. 
It is helpful, therefore, to adopt a less formalistic approach to 
the problem and to probe beyond normal legal analysis to account 
for this remarkable constitutional development. For even if broad-
casting and the printing press are essentially the same, they never-
theless have different origins, have existed for different periods of 
time, and one has been controlled from its beginnings while the other 
has been left unrestricted. It is important, in short, that our analysis 
be sensitive to the historical process through which the present sys-
tem has developed. 
Such an approach reveals two closely interrelated factors that 
help reconcile the divergent traditions within the press. First, 
society has long considered broadcasting to be meaningfully different 
48. The following discussion would still be important even if there existed a seri-
ous possibility of a material difference justifying regulation only of the electronic 
media. If regulation is properly limited on a basis other than the differences sug-
gested above-as is argued in the text below-the Court need not undertake the trou-
blesome and frequently ephemeral task of making comparisons as the bases for their 
deci~ions. 
49. See Lange, supra note 5. 
50. See, e.g., 2 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 640-41. 
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from the print media, and this perception has greatly influenced the 
decision to allow regulation only in the former. Understanding this 
perception and its effects is necessary for an appreciation of the com-
plex way in which first amendment theory is implemented and devel-
oped. Second, broadcast regulation involves only a part of the press; 
this fact provides not only an explanation for past treatment by the 
courts but also offers the most rational basis for future constitutional 
adjudication in this area. 
B. Divergent Societal Perceptions of Broadcasting 
and Print Media 
The phenomenon of broadcast regulation has, in many respects, 
the qualities of an historical accident. An examination of its origins 
and development reveals the striking ease with which it slid into our 
political and constitutional system. One stark fact is apparent: 
Society obviously has thought differently about broadcasting than it 
has about the print media. Certainly doubts and objections have 
been raised periodically, 51 but on the whole there have not been the 
outcries against censorship that would undoubtedly have occurred if 
regulation had been imposed on newspapers. 52 Broadcasters, al-
though often lamenting what they considered to be public insensitiv-
ity to their first amendment rights, have been conspicuously unasser-
tive of their rights. 53 Even the scholarly community has tended to 
overlook the significance of the constitutional treatment of broadcast-
ing. Major casebooks published as late as 1965, for example, did 
·not even mention either the existence of broadcast regulation or the 
seminal NBC decision. 54 Even after Red Lion, major casebooks did 
not present broadcast regulation as posing a significant constitutional 
dilemma; broadcast decisions were merely described briefly in a note 
format. 55 A recently published major casebook continues to de-
scribe the broadcast decisions in a long note, does not address the 
broader first amendment significance of the decision to regulate, and 
51. See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 21; Robinson, supra note 30. 
52. "In brief, we all take as commonplace a degree of government surveillance 
for broadcasting which would by instant reflex ignite the fiercest protest were it 
found in other areas of communication." Kalven, supra note 21, at 16. See also 2 
Z. CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 637. 
53. Writing before Red Lion, Professor Kalven suggested that "the [broadcasting] 
industry has under-estimated its legal position and given up too soon." Kalven, supra 
note 21, at 24. 
54. See N. DOWLING & G. GUNTIIER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (7th ed. 1965). 
55. See the two-page note on Red Lion in G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1225-26 (8th ed. 1970). 
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provides no cross reference to Miami Herald in connection with the 
discussion of libel. 56 If the scholars who formulate and organize for 
study the most pressing issues under the first amendment fail to find 
any particular significance in broadcast regulation other than as a 
minor exception to the general rules, it is not surprising that society 
generally has apparently failed to recognize the broadcast cases as 
a major departure from first amendment principles. 
Furthermore, one of the more striking pieces of evidence of a 
general perception that broadcasting is somehow "special" is the fact 
that, during the past half century of regulation, there have been 
remarkably few attempts to expand any part of the rather extensive 
regulatory structure into the print media. 57 Broadcast regulation has 
been an isolated phenomenon, not a basecamp for incursions into 
the print media. 
A search for explanations as to why the electronic media have 
been regarded as distinct from the print media should begin with 
the Supreme Court decisions. After all, the Court in an early case 
appeared to dismiss the broadcasters' first amendm~nt arguments as 
being unworthy of serious discussion and officially embraced the 
physical scarcity rationale.58 The Red Lion opinion, moreover, is 
written as if the result were inexorable, and gives no hint that the 
Court is troubled by its earlier analysis in NBC. These decisions 
undoubtedly reinforced the view that regulation in the "public inter-
est" was somehow appropriate in this "unique" medium. Like the 
56. See w. LoCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CoNSTITimONAL LAW 975-79, 
1201-10 (4th ed. 1975). In the ninth edition of the Gunther casebook, published 
in 1975, Red Lion and CBS are described in a three-page textual comment and 
Tornillo immediately afterwards in a two-page note. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON CONSTmJTIONAL LAW 1230-34 (1975), 
57. Although in the past half century there have been numerous proposals ad• 
vanced for some form of access regulation, see, e.g., 2 z. CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 
694-95; Barron supra note 8, few seemed to have reached even the stage of serious 
legislative debate and far fewer have been enacted. A Mississippi right-of-reply stat• 
ute, MISS. CODE ANN. § 3175 (1942) (now MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-3-35 (1972)), 
was essentially overturned in Manasco v. Walley, 216 Miss. 614, 63 So.2d 91 (1953). 
In 1969, Nevada repealed its right-of-reply statute, Law of April 14, 1969, ch. 310, 
§ 10, [1969), repealing NEV. RBv. STAT. § 200.570 (1963). As already noted, see 
note 7 supra, the Florida statute considered in Miami Herald had lain dormant since 
its enactment in 1913. 
In 1970, Congressman Farbstein introduced a bill in the House of Representatives 
which would have authorized the Federal Communications Commission to apply fair-
ness doctrine concepts to newspapers. H.R. 18927, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The 
bill was never reported out of Committee. In 1973, the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court issued an Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, - Mass. -, 298 N.E.2d 
829 ( 1973), in which it advised against the constitutionality of a right-of-reply statute 
then under consideration in the Massachusetts General Assembly. 
58. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), dis-
cussed in note 21 supra. 
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legerdermain of the pornography decisions to the effect that obscen-
ity is not "speech" and therefore not constitutionally protected, 59 the 
Court's reliance on the physical scarcity rationale may have provided 
an intellectual construct that facilitated ignoring the logical ramifica-
tions of the decision. 
It would be misleading, however, to attribute too much weight 
to the Court's role. There is considerable evidence of a widespread 
societal predisposition to broadcast regulation. For example, al-
though no one has ever questioned the government's decision to take 
some action to alleviate the problems of interference caused by over-
crowding of the spectrum, there were several alternative methods of 
allocation that would have involved far less governmental intervention 
into traditional journalistic functions, but which were not seriously 
considered. Illustratively, Congress could have allocated frequen-
cies on a first-come-first-served basis, relying primarily on chance to 
determine the composition of the medium. 60 Or it could have 
awarded licenses to the highest bidders in an auction, or to winners 
in a lottery, following the more traditional laissez-faire path of per-
mitting a mixture of chance and market pressures to determine the 
shape of the medium. 61 Rather than selecting any of these methods, 
however, Congress opted for the extraordinary choice of regulating 
a branch of the communications industry in the "public interest. "62 
What is startling about this decision is not the form of public control 
selected, which was the prevailing response of the time to economic 
concentration, but the fact that it was adopted so easily in the first 
amendment context. 
Satisfactory explanations for developments such as this are always 
elusive, but at least several can be suggested. Our society has gen-
erally perceived the electronic media as more entertainment-ori-
ented than the print media. Although the Court held in Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson68 that the first amendment protected non-
political speech, that case was not decided until long after broad-
cast regulation had been instituted and approved in NBC. By the 
59. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957). 
60. See 395 U.S. at 390-91. · 
61. This approach is urged in Coase, Evaluation of Public Policy Relating to Ra-
dio and Television Broadcasting: Social and Economic Issues, 41 J. LAND & P.U. 
EcoN. 161 (1965). See also, Kalven, supra note 21, at 30-32. 
62. "The Communications Act is not designed primarily as a new code for the 
adjustment of conflicting private rights through adjudication. Rather it expresses a 
desire on the part of Congress to maintain, through appropriate administrative con-
trol, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission." FCC v. Pottsville Broad-
casting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940). 
63. 343 U.S. 495, 499-502 (1952). 
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time Burstyn was decided; regulations in broadcasting had received 
widespread acceptance, so that even after that decision our society 
may have continued to be less sensitive to restrictions on nonpoliti-
cal speech. 64 Further, the different treatment accorded broadcasting 
may in part be attributable to the unknown nature of the medium 
at the time regulation was imposed. · The features of broadcasting 
technology have long been embryonic and, consequently, the prob-
lems broadcasting might present have seemed so unpredictable as 
to warrant regulation as a precautionary measure. Finally, since the 
government was virtually compelled to intervene in broadcasting in 
order to alleviate the problem of signal interference, that justifiable 
intervention may well have eased the path for more extensive 
attempts to structure the medium. The brute fact of governmental 
licensing served to isolate the medium from our tradition of nonregu-
lation. Broadc~ting was emphatically not the same as the print 
media, and it may not have been important that the difference did 
not justify everything done to it. 
An explanation for the phenomenon is, however, of secondary 
importance to the fact of its existence. Crucial here is not that 
broadcasting is in fact different in principle from the print media, 
but that it has been believed to be different. This difference in per-
ception goes a long way in explaining the contrasting first amend-
ment protections afforded both branches of the media. In the area 
of first amendment rights, there has been a perennial concern over 
the political consequences of oversight, which is reflected in the idea 
that regulation lets the "camel's nose in the tent."65 It has rightly 
been thought necessary to maintain a firm line against governmental 
intrusion (the camel's nose) into freedom of speech and press in 
order to avoid continual disputation over the scope of those free-
doms, which may itself snuff out the vitality of those rights. Speak-
ing in the late 1940s of proposals to regulate newspapers, Professor 
Chafee argued: 
The First Amendment embodied a very strong tradition that the 
government should keep its hands off the press. Every new govern-
mental activity in relation to the communication of news and ideas, 
however laudable its purpose, tends to undermine this tradition and 
render further activities easier. "If we do this, why can't we do 
that?" Appetite grows by what it feeds on. Legal barriers can of 
course be erected, but it takes constant effort to prevent them from 
being nibbled away. Therefore, no proposal for governmental action 
64. Cf. Kalven, supra note 21, at 30. 
65. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 
U.S. 94, 154 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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should be judged in isolation. It must be considered in relation to 
other possible state controls over the press, which have not yet been 
suggested. 66 
21 
Indeed, this prospect of expanding intervention by the state is a 
troublesome aspect of access regulation, which has many different 
faces and only a broadly stated purpose that contains no sharp limita-
tions on governmental authority. Even if a decision to allow access 
regulation would not unleash an irresistible drive for impermissible 
controls, the substantial public debate that might well be generated 
over more intrusive regulation could itself serve to chill the inde-
pendent function of the press. 67 
These concerns have had much greater significance in the con-
text of the print media than in that of the broadcasting industry be-
cause of the differences society has perceived in them. It is note-
worthy, for example, that Professor Chafee made his argument only in 
the newspaper context. 68 While it is true that Chafee thought regula-
tion of broadcasting was constitutionally appropriate because of the 
physical limitations on access, the fact that regulation has merit does 
not, of course, render the camel's-nose-in-the-tent argument inapposite 
in that area. Instead, the real reason for not raising the argument in 
the broadcasting context is suggested by the reference in the quota-
tion to the longstanding "tradition that the government should keep 
its hands off the press." 
Access regulation in the print media would have immediately sig-
nified a pronounced break with traditional first amendment theory. 
If the Court had, for instance, approved the creation of a Federal 
Newspaper Commission to administer a fairness doctrine, a spon-
taneous national debate over the wisdom and implications of the 
decision would almost certainly have erupted. The constitutional 
law casebooks would have prominently displayed the decision, sup-
plementing it with text asking probing questions about the holding. 
What before had seemed unthinkable would then have become 
thinkable; the free, autonomous press long symbolic of the first 
66. 2 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 683. Chafee added at a later point: 
Once government becomes active in the communications field, it can go on in-
definitely. Zealous officials will keep thinking up new ways for improving the 
press according to their own ideals. And there is no bright line between en-
couragement and repression . . . . If officials can tell newspapers what to put 
into their editorial pages, as is proposed for the Free Press Authority, it is only 
a step to tell them what to leave out. 
id. at 709-10. 
67. This is a danger that has found frequent expression in the state-aid-to-religion 
cases, see, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971), but whose rele-
vance is not limited to that branch of the first amendment. · 
68. See note 66 supra. 
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amendment would have been put on a leash. 69 No longer would 
the Court be seen as merely sanctioning an aberrant regulatory sys-
tem limited to a distinct, novel technology of communication, but 
instead would be seen as pursuing a major policy change with respect 
to the first amendment. 
Thus, the way our society has thought about the two branches 
of the media has deeply affected the issue of whether to permit 
access regulation in either area. 70 Regulation has been more toler-
able in the broadcast sector because circumstances there have con-
fined its implications. This is not, it should be noted, an isolated 
phenomenon. It is rather typical of a general tendency revealed in 
the case law to permit the government greater leeway in controlling 
the development of new technologies of communication. An inter-
esting analogy to the broadcast regulation cases are the Supreme 
Court decisions involving motion pictures. 
Treated as a suspicious newcomer to the system of expression, 
motion pictures were first assigned an inferior status, almost as if 
there were a first amendment initiation rite. In 1915, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the medium was not entitled to any first amendment 
protection, 71 and, although this anomaly was readily apparent, the 
69. In his last book, The Morality of Consent, the late Alexander Bickel seems 
to express a similar idea in connection with the Pentagon Papers case, New York 
Times Co. v. United States, 413 U.S. 713 (1971). Part of the significance of that 
case, as Bickel notes, was that it signified the first instance in our history in which 
the federal government sought "to censor a newspaper by attempting to impose a re-
straint prior to publication, directly or in litigation." A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF 
CONSENT 61 (1975). Thus, even though the Supreme Court ultimately vindicated 
the right of the New York Times to publish the material, the "spell was broken, and 
in a sense freedom was thus diminished." Id. Bickel went on to say: "The conflict 
and contention by which we extend freedom seem to mark, or at least to threaten, 
a contraction; and in truth they do, for they endanger an assumed freedom which 
appeared limitless because its limits were untried. Appearance and reality are nearly 
one. We extend the legal reality of freedom at some cost in its limitless appearance, 
And the cost is real." Id. Thus, the first perceived break with tradition, and the 
very fact of having seriously considered the proposition asserted by the government, 
served to undercut our sense of freedom from this type of governmental activity and 
to highlight the possibilities for future action for those interested in trying again. 
70. This thought may be in part what Professor Emerson had in mind when, after 
concluding that access regulation in the broadcast media can be justified "out of af-
firmative concepts of the First Amendment,'' he stated: 
Such a doctrine of First Amendment power and limitation is far-reaching and 
entails obvious dangers. Applied to the press, for example, it might authorize 
controls over newspaper coverage that would be highly questionable. In the area 
of radio and television, however, the government is already heavily involved 
with the task of preventing electrical interference and solving similar engineering 
problems. Thus, the regulations have a different substantive and administrative 
impact and would not necessarily constitute an abridgment of free expression in 
the same way as comparable regulations in other areas not already heavily 
weighted by government controls. 
T. EMERSON, supra note 21, at 665 (emphasis added). 
71. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 236 U.S. 230 (1915). Interpreting a 
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Court did not lift the yoke of censorship until its 1952 decision in 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson.72 In that case the Court extended 
first amendment protections to motion pictures, although it was quick 
to caution that it did not "follow ,that motion pictures are necessar-
ily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method 
of expression."73 The constitutional principles that permitted mo-
tion pictures to be treated differently were not specified, and the 
issue of different treatment soon arose in 1961 in Times Film Corp. 
v. Chicago74 and again, in 1965, in Freedman v. Maryland.75 In 
those cases, the Court sanctioned local laws permitting blatant prior 
censorship of motion pictures. 76 Although the Court has never 
provision of the Ohio constitution comparable in scope to the first amendment, the 
Court stated: "It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures 
is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other specta-
cles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio constitution, we 
think, as part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion." 236 U.S. 
at 244. 
72. 343 U.S. 495 (1952). The Court struck down as an invalid prior restraint 
a New York statute that authorized the department of education to deny a license 
to show a film if it was "sacrilegious". 
73. 343 U.S. at 503. 
74. 365 U.S. 43 (1961). 
75. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
76. At issue in Times Film was a Chicago ordinance requiring that prior to ex-
hibition all films had to be submitted to the commissioner of police, who was au-
thorized to refuse a permit if various standards were not met. Certain punishments 
were provided for showing a motion picture without a permit. The petitioner had 
refused to submit its film "Don Juan" for prior screening, and the commissioner of 
police had accordingly refused to issue a permit. Petitioner then sought injunctive 
relief against enforcement of the ordinance on the ground that it violated the first 
and fourteenth amendments. 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the majority interpreted the petition-
er's claim as an assertion that the state could never, for any reason, restrain any mo-
tion picture prior to exhibition. The Court rejected this position noting that in Near 
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), it had specifically listed certain areas (including 
obscenity) as being legitimately within the reach of prior restraints. But the Times 
Film Court seemed to say more, to extend "its blessing," as Chief Justice Warren 
noted in dissent, 365 U.S. at 65 (Warren, CJ., dissenting), to the procedure embod-
ied by the Chicago ordinance that required all motion pictures to be submitted to 
a censor before exhibition so that the city could exclude those that were obscene. 
Aside from a cryptic reference to the need to consider in each case the "capacity 
for evil" in determining the "permissible scope of community ~ntrol," the Court 
made no attempt to distinguish movies from other forms of expression. 365 U.S. at 
49-50. At the very end of the opinion, Justice Clark observed simply: "At this time 
we say no more than this--that we are dealing only with motion pictures and, even 
as to them, only in the context of the broadside attack presented on this record." 365 ~dm . . 
The dissent in Times Film attacked the majority on the ground that it had failed 
to explain "why moving pictures should be treated differently than any other form 
of expression, why moving pictures should be denied the protection against censorship 
-'a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned.'" 
365 U.S. at 50, 76 (Warren, C.J., dissenting), quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). As to the suggestion that censorship of movies is appro-
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explicitly so held, presumably it would be unconstitutional to require 
that all books be submitted to an official body before publication so 
that obscene material could be censored. 77 Yet the Court has essen-
tially authorized this procedure for films without, it should be added, 
articulating why movies are different from books in any important 
respect. 
The film and broadcasting cases seem to demonstrate that new 
technologies of communication are both new battlegrounds for 
renewed fighting over old first amendment issues and focal points 
for reform efforts. 78 As a result, the actual implementation of first 
priate because movies have a special "impact," the dissent argued that there was no 
evidence of an extraordinary impact and that, even if there were, the first amendment 
still forbade such prior censorship. 365 U.S. at 77. 
In Freedman v. Maryland the Court held that the Constitution required various 
procedural protections in any censorship system that requires prior submission of 
films. As to why such a system is constitutional at all, the Court stated simply that 
"[t]he requirement of prior submission to a censor sustained in Times Film is con-
sistent with our recognition that films differ from other forms of expression." 380 
U.S. at 60-61. Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Black joined, stated merely that 
"[i]f censors are banned from the publishing business, from the pulpit, from the public 
platform-as they are-they should be banned from the theatre." 380 U.S. at 62 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
77. Cf. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957). 
78. The so-called loudspeaker cases constitute another line of decisions that il-
lustrates the Court's efforts to accommodate both the government's regulatory interest 
in the context of a new technology of communication and traditional first amendment 
interests. Permeating the cases are issues of access, privacy, and the scope of govern-
mental regulation. In the first such case, Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), 
the Court held invalid a city ordinance that prohibited the use of sound amplifying 
equipment unless the user had first obtained permission from the chief of police. 
Since the ordinance provided no standards for the issuance of permits, the Court said 
it constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Douglas said that, while loudspeakers could be regulated as to time, place and man-
ner, they could not be completely banned simply because they could be abused. 334 
U.S. at 562. Justice Frankfurter dissented, arguing that the problem of preserving 
privacy in the face of new technologies which could greatly amplify the human voice 
was so important and so intractable that local communities should be afforded con-
siderable latitude in devising solutions. 334 U.S. at 566 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), 
Justice Jackson also dissented, stating that "society has the right to control, as to 
place, time and volume, the use of loud-speaking devices for any purpose, provided 
its regulations are not unduly arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory." 334 U.S. at 
569 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), although no one opinion commanded 
a majority of the justices, the court upheld a conviction for violation of an ordinance 
that forbade the use on public streets of a "sound truck" that emits "loud and raucous 
noises." Three justices held that the ordinance did not completely prohibit sound 
trucks but only permissibly barred those that emitted "loud and raucous noises." Jus-
tice Frankfurter concurred speaking generally of the idea that freedom of speech has 
a "preferred position" in the Constitution. At the end of his opinion, however, he 
objected to the argument that all forms of communication must be treated alike. Re-
ferring rather vaguely to movies and broadcasting, he asserted that both media had 
presented special "problems" that permitted their different first amendment treat-
ment. As for loudspeakers, Justice Frankfurter said that "only a disregard of vital 
differences between natural speech . . . and the noise of sound trucks would give 
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amendment theory is much more complex than commonly supposed. 
The traditional areas of communication, generally the primary focus 
of attention, retain their purity while new technologies of communi-
cation are treated as analytically discrete and are subjected to various 
social controls. 
This first amendment development process is not wholly undesir-
able. For a dynamic social system in which new problems continu-
ally arise, this process of juxtaposing innovation in a new technology 
of communication against tradition may offer a highly effective and 
useful mode of adaptation. The opportunity to implement change 
without the appearance of change can, in this respect, be a disguised 
blessing brought by the new technologies. 
As the movie cases illustrate, however, there are significant risks 
associated with hidden regulation. Improper regulation, for ex-
ample, may fester longer because it is not subjected to comprehen-
sive analysis. Further, those persons within the regulated medium 
can, over time, lose an awareness that their constitutional rights are 
being violated. If courts and political institutions appear to be insen-
sitive to their first amendment freedoms, and if the public and their 
sound trucks the constitutional rights accorded to the unaided human voice." Since 
they posed greater dangers to the countervailing right of privacy, it was not for the 
"Court to devise the terms on which sound trucks should be allowed to operate, if 
at all;'' 336 U.S. at 96-97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
Justice Jackson also filed a concurring opinion, in which he indicated that com-
plete prohibition would be permissible. The only limit he would place on state au-
thority is that it not "censor the contents of the broadcasting." He then added: 
I do not agree that, if we sustain regulations or prohibitions of sound trucks, 
they must therefore be valid if applied to other methods of "communication of 
ideas." The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the 
sound truck and the street comer orator have differing natures, values, abuses 
and dangers. Each, in my view, is a law unto itself, and all we are dealing with 
now is the sound truck. 
336 U.S. at 47 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
Interpreting the ordinance as completely enjoining the use of loudspeakers, Justice 
Black wrote a strongly worded dissent in which Justices Douglas and Rutledge joined. 
336 U.S. at 98 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black said the decision of the majority 
"would surely not be reached by this Court if such channels of communication as 
the press, radio, or moving pictures were similarly attacked." 336 U.S. at 102. He 
opined that such arbitrary treatment of means of communication carried the evil of 
giving "an overpowering influence to views of owners of legally favored instruments 
of communication." 336 U.S. at 102. Moreover, he appeared to suggest that, since 
loudspeakers are often used by persons without the money to operate newspapers or 
publish books, and since such persons often have different views than those who op-
erate more traditional channels of communication, a restriction on the use of loud-
speakers may deprive the public of access to important views. 336 U.S. at 103. 
The tendency to treat new means of communication as analytically discrete may 
contain more than a bald refusal to account for differences between new and tradi-
tional methods of expression. It may also reflect an unwillingness to restrict every-
where within the system of expression the government's interest in regulation. As 
new media enter the system, the state's interests in regulation may become more le-
gitimate as the effects of the regulation are more limited. 
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professional counterparts in other branches of the media consistently 
fail to support them, 79 these persons might well become discouraged 
and less assertive of their rights against the government.8° For the 
Court, therefore, to rely on fictional differences between new and tra-
ditional media may ultimately be counterproductive. It serves un-
necessarily to isolate important means of communication from our first 
amendment traditions, and the Court abdicates its important role of 
instilling in those communicating within the society a full sense of 
their constitutional rights. 
With respect to broadcasting, moreover, the perception of the 
medium as "different" will eventually fade, as appears to be already 
happening. 81 When all the communications media finally are per-
ceived as the same in principle, the Court will then be pressed to justify 
its different treatment. By that time it may be thought appropriate to 
say what is apparently said about some other anomalies, like the 
powers of the grand jury or the special status of the insanity defense, 82 
that the explanation is to be found in the legitimacy that time itself can 
give. But in the case of access regulation in the press, the Court can 
say much more. 
C. The Rationality of Partial Regulation 
Ultimately, the Court's decisions on the question of access regula-
tion exhibit fundamental good sense. The good sense, however, 
derives not from the Court's treatment of broadcasting as being 
somehow special, but rather from its apparent desire to limit the 
79. It is interesting that in none of the Supreme Court's three major decisions 
on broadcast regulation did any newspaper or newspaper association file an amicus 
curiae brief. 
80. Cf. Kalven, supra note 21, at 15-17. 
81. One of the more interesting aspects of the Red Lion-CBS decisions is the shift 
in idiom used in discussing the first amendment rights of broadcasters. As described 
previously, see text at notes 17-22 supra, Red Lion placed heavy emphasis on the 
right of the public to receive different viewpoints and seemingly little weight on the 
journalistic freedom of the broadcasters. See 395 U.S. at 386-90. The focus was 
on broadcasters qua "licensees" and not qua "journalists." In contrast, the CBS 
opinion reflects a significant shift in tone. The Court for the first time referred to 
broadcasters as a part of the "press," as is illustrated by the following excerpt: 
Nor can we accept the Court of Appeals' view that every potential speaker 
is "the best judge" of what the listening public ought to hear or indeed the best 
judge of the merits of his or her views. All journalistic tradition and experience 
is to the contrary. For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and edit-
ing is selection and choice of material. That editors-newspapers or broadcast 
--can and do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny 
the discretion Congress provided. Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order 
to preserve higher values. 
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-
25 (1973). 
82. See Henkin, On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 72 (1968). 
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over-all reach of access regulation. The Court need not, how-
ever, isolate the electronic media to achieve this result. Although 
it is uncertain whether the Court in Miami Herald saw it as such, the 
critical difference between what the Court was asked to do in Red 
Lion and what it was asked to do in Miami Herald involved choosing 
between a partial regulatory system and a universal one. Viewed 
from that perspective, the Court reached the correct result in both 
cases. 
The central problem in this area results from the complexity of 
the access issue. The truth of the matter is, as the Court's opinions 
so plainly, if unintentionally, demonstrate, that there are good first 
amendment reasons for being both receptive to and wary of access 
regulation. This dual nature of access legislation suggests the need 
to limit carefully the intrusiveness of the regulation in order safely 
to enjoy its remedial benefits. Thus, a proper judicial response is one 
that will permit the legislature to provide the public with access 
somewhere within the mass media, but not throughout the press. 
The Court should not, ·and need not, be forced into an all-or-nothing 
position on ,this matter; there is nothing in the .first amendment that 
forbids having the best of both worlds. 
Access regulation both responds to constitutional traditions and 
cuts against them. On the one hand, it helps to make possible the 
realization of first amendment goals. Unlike attempts to censor 
types of speech, an access rule is designed to operate in the service 
of the first amendment. It seeks to neutralize the disparities that 
impede the proper functioning of the "market-place of ideas," to 
equalize opportunities within our society to command an audience 
and thereby to mobilize public opinion, and in that sense to help real-
ize democratic ideals. 
That unrestrained private interests can, at times, hamper the free 
exchange of ideas as seriously as governmental censorship has been 
apparent with painful clarity within the past half century. Chafee 
wrote several decades ago about the need to define a new theoreti-
cal structure for governmental involvement in the implementation of 
first amendment rights in response to the problems of private 
censorship: 
[W]hat is the use of telling an unpopular speaker that he will incur 
no criminal penalties by his proposed address, so long as every hall 
owner in the city declines to rent him space for his meeting and there 
are no vacant lots available? There should be municipal auditoriums, 
schoolhouses out of school hours, church forums, parks in summer, 
all open to thresh out every question of public importance, with just 
as few restrictions as possible; for otherwise the subjects that most 
28 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:1 
need to be discussed will be the very subjects that will be ruled out 
as unsuitable for discussion. 
We must do more than remove the discouragements to open dis-
cussion. We must exert ourselves to supply active encouragements.83 
Chafee's articulation of the seeds of an "affirmative" theory of 
freedom of speech constituted an important qualification of the 
thinking of laissez-faire theorists such as John Stuart Mill and John 
Milton. Many commentators since Chafee have elaborated on his 
idea. 84 The debate that has been generated unquestionably involves 
the most vital first amendment issues of our time. 
The Supreme Court has, through its actions, occasionally demon-
strated that it recognizes the serious problems posed by unregulated 
private interests operating in areas that affect the first amendment. 
In a seminal decision in Associated Press v. United States,8r, the 
Court approved a governmental order directing a national wire ser-
vice to make its news available on a nondiscriminatory basis, stating 
that "[f]reedom of the press from governmental interference under 
the first amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom 
by private interests."86 In another well-known line of cases the 
Court held that a private company town and a shopping center were 
prohibited under the first amendment from excluding certain speech 
that the private owners would have preferred to censor.87 These 
decisions, together with Red Lion, outline a still tentative approach 
to removing tile inequalities in speech opportunities. 88 
Of all the efforts thus far to restructure private arrangements that 
impinge on the "market-place of ideas," access regulation represents 
the most direct assault, and, consequently, the most dangerous.80 Al-
83. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 559 (1941). 
84. See T. EMERSON, supra note 21, at ch. xvii; Reich, The Law of the Planned 
Society, 15 YALE LJ. 1227 (1966). 
85. 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
86. 326 U.S. at 20. 
87. See Mai;sh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Amalgamated Food Employees 
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). But see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 
U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
88. An interesting response to the problem of access in the mass media has been 
the noticeable solicitude for minor modes of communication. Judicial opinions and 
scholarly commentary have emphasized the need for protection of these methods of 
communication precisely because of the restricted nature of the press. See, e.g., Mar-
tin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Door to door distribution of circulars 
is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people"); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U.S. 77, 98 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Kalven, The Concept of the 
Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 30; Stone, Fora Americana: 
Speech in Public Places, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 233, 233-34. Though important, this 
is hardly an adequate response to the problem of concentration in the mass media. 
89. Other major attempts at reform have come primarily in the area of antitrust 
law. The Newspaper Preservation Act, Pub. L No. 91-353, 84 Stat. 466 (1970) (co-
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though its aims conform to those of the first amendment, the methods 
of access regulation constitute a significant departure from our tradi-
tional constitutional notions concerning the need to maintain a dis-
tance between the government and the press, especially on matters 
directly touching news content. Access regulation carries the 
greatest potential for altering the press as we have known it and for 
exposing us to grave risks. 
In general, access regulation may have three adverse conse-
quences for the marketplace of ideas. The first is a commonly 
identified cost of access regulation: It may have a depressing effect 
on journalistic motivation to engage in discourse on social issues. 90 
This cost is presumably greater with some forms of access regulation 
than with others. The chilling effect associated with the right-of-
reply rules. is likely much greater than that associated with the 
requirement that editors publish all advertisements on a nondis-
criminatory basis. Even where the chilling effect is thought to be 
a problem, however, no data exist as to the extent to which the regu-
lation does, in fact, have an inhibiting effect. Nevertheless, in those 
cases where a significant chilling effect may predictably occur, there 
is cause for concern, given our general commitment to the idea that· 
debate is most likely to be fruitful if it is "uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open."91 The prospect that some regulated editors will choose 
to forego coverage of some political discussion because of reply 
requirements need not necessitate rejection of access regulation; its 
benefits may still outweigh this cost. Such a cost, however, remains 
a matter of concern, and should be minimized as much as possible. 
A second general concern associated with access regulation 
involves the risk that the administrative machinery required to imple-
ment it will be used to force the press into some official line and 
dified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1970) ), is a recent example of the use of the anti-
trust laws to foster opportunities for debate within the press. However, it also rep-
resents a recognition that the antitrust laws themselves are not likely to achieve more 
diversity of outlets since the high economies of scale in the newspaper industry seem 
to lead to the creation of natural monopolies. See B. ScHMIDT, supra note 3, at 51-
54. 
On a private level one might note the recent formation of the National News 
Council. The Council is a mediating organization with no powers of enforcement. 
For a description of its operation and an analysis of the effectiveness of this and 
other press councils, see Ritter & Leibowitz, Press Councils: The Answer to Our 
First Amendment Dilemma, 1974 DUKE L.J. 845. 
90. For an evaluation of the chilling effect of access regulation, see Lange, supra 
note 5, at 70-71; Kalven, supra note 21, at 19-23; Robinson, supra note 30, at 136-
40. It will be recalled that the Court in Red Lion dismissed the broadcaster's chill-
ing effect argument as speculative, while in Miami Herald it relied on the argument 
in striking down the regulation. See text at notes 11-19 supra. 
91. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964). 
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will undermine its role as a critic and antagonist of government. Al-
though neither Red Lion nor Miami Herald discussed this risk, the 
possibility of official misbehavior has been a traditional reason for 
withholding approval of governmental schemes to "improve" the 
press. 92 It is a consideration that reflects the sum of our experience 
and should not be lightly disregarded. Evidence that this risk is still 
vital may, regrettably, be found in an examination of our recent 
upheaval in presidential politics. 
In the course of the revelations about Watergate, it became 
known that the executive branch, angered by unflattering remarks, 
criticisms and disclosures of government secrets, embarked on an ex-
tensive campaign to harass the press. A substantial part of the attack 
apparently involved using administrative machinery to apply pressure 
on journalists.93 There were also serious allegations that the execu-
tive branch had sought to apply pressure directly on the Washington 
Post by creating difficulties for the Post's subsidiary radio stations 
with the Federal Communications Commission.94 If there is a 
Watergate lesson for the first amendment, therefore, it is that we 
should continue to be extremely wary of making available official 
92. See, e.g., 2 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 476-77. 
93. One of the impeachment charges leveled by the House Judiciary Committee 
was that officials of the Nixon administration had induced, or had suggested induc-
ing, tax audits of troublesome members of the media. See CONGRESSIONAL INFORMA-
TION SERVICE (1974), H521-34, at 16, 18, 21. 
The willingness of the administration to employ federal machinery to silence the 
press was most vividly reflected in the events surrounding the creation of the "enemy 
list" John Dean, then the President's legal counsel, stated in one memorandum: 
"This memorandum addresses the matter of how we can maximize the fact of our 
incumbency in dealing with persons known to be active in their opposition to our 
administration. Stated a bit more bluntly-how we can use the available federal ma-
chinery to screw our political enemies." CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 
(1973), S961-4, at 1689. Dean went on to suggest that "grant availability, federal 
contracts, litigation, prosecution, etc." should all be considered in determining how 
most effectively to "screw" opponents. Id. The enemy list as compiled contained 
a total of 51 reporters, editors, columnists and television commentators. Id. at 1716• 
18. The Washington Post, the New York Times and the St. Louis Post Dispatch 
were among the institutions included. Id. at 1716. See also Washington Post, Dec. 
3, 1973, section A, at 24, col. 4 (documents disclosed by Senator Lowell Weicker): 
THE WI-ll'I'E HousE TRANSCRIPTS 57-58, 63, 404, 782-84 (Bantam Books, Inc. 1974). 
94. In January 1973, the Associated Press and United Press International re-
ported that the broadcast licenses of two Florida television stations, both owned by 
the Washington Post, were being challenged before the Federal Communications 
Commission by a group which included long-time friends and political associates of 
President Nixon. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1973, at 21, col. 1; Washington Post, Jan. 3, 
1973, section A, at 6, col. 1. It was subsequently revealed that Glenn J. Sedam, Jr., 
general counsel to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, had advised 
some of the Nixon associates involved in the challenges. Washington Post, Jan. 9, 
1973, section A. at 6, col. 1. Only the Post's two stations, out of 36 stations in the 
state, had their licenses contested. It should be noted, however, that the administra• 
tion and all the principals involved in the challenges denied any political motivation. 
Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1973, section A, at 6, col. 1, 
November 1976] Freedom of the Press and Public Access 31 
machinery for the regulation of the press. Such a regulatory struc-
ture would stand as a constant temptation to governmental officials-
a source of leverage with which to compel obedience within the press 
and, in more subtle ways, to manipulate the content of public debate. 
The third potential adverse consequence of access regulation is 
that it may result in an escalation of regulation, the camel's-nose-
in-the-tent phenomena mentioned earlier.95 This criticism is one of 
those stock arguments that suffers badly .from overuse. It is easy 
to dismiss the claim because it is advanced so often in circumstances 
where it carries no conviction. With respect to access regulation, 
however, the argument has powerful force and should not go 
unheeded. 
The problem is not simply that regulation will induce irresistable 
pressure for censorship. The dangers are more subtle and compli-
cated. Access regulation comes in a variety of shapes and sizes. 
Some forms, like a vigorously enforced fairness doctrine, may lead 
to utter blandness of content and in this way may permit official 
manipulation of the news. In addition, it is virtually impossible for 
the Court to articulate in advance unambiguous standards. Experi-
ence with a particular regulation will often be necessary to judge its 
desirability and constitutionality. It is important to know, for 
example, how frequently the government will be drawn into conflict 
with the editors, 96 what financial burdens the administrative proce-
dures will impose on those that are regulated, and whether the 
administering officials will be prone to misconduct or will exhibit a 
healthy respect for first amendment freedoms.97 
By sanctioning the concept of access regulation, the Court can 
expect administrative experimentation with the various types of regu-
lation. And since clear guidelines cannot be established, there may 
be constant pressure to expand the regulatory power into imper-
missible areas. The clamour for greater -regulation may itself be 
used as a weapon to bend the press into line. If what turns out to 
be improper regulation is imposed, irremediable harm may have 
already occurred before the Court acts. Similarly, the difnculties in 
assessing the future consequences of the regulation may lead the 
95. See text at note 65 supra. 
96. Such data has been available with respect to broadcast regulation. We know, 
for example, that in fiscal 1973, the Commission received about 2,400 fairness doc-
trine complaints and forwarded 94 to broadcasters for comment. 39 Fed. Reg. 26,375 
(1974). 
97. For an indication that consideration of the type of person likely to assume 
the administrative role is relevant here, see Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 
43, 69-73 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). See also J. Mn.TON, A.REOPAGITICA 210 (3 Har-
vard Classics ( 1909)). 
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Court to sanction conduct that is ultimately very harmful. 98 In both 
instances, it must be remembered that "[l]egal experiments, once 
started, cannot be stopped the moment they show signs of working 
badly."00 
Viewed in its entirety, therefore, access regulation is both desir-
able and dangerous. That it raises a constitutional problem of enor-
mous difficulty is reflected in the schizophrenic nature of Red Lion 
and Miami Herald. In light of the double-edged character of access 
regulation, the Court's appropriate response is to affirm congres-
sional authority to implement only a partial regulatory scheme. Only 
with this approach, with a major branch of the press remaining free 
of regulation, will the costs and risks of regulation be held at an 
acceptable level. Or, put another way, only under such a system 
can we afford to allow the degree of governmental regulation that is 
necessary to realize the objectives of public access. 
One advantage of a partial regulatory system is that the unregu-
lated sector provides an effective check against each of the costs of 
regulation. A partial scheme offers some assurance that infor-
mation that might not be disseminated by the regulated sector of the 
press will nevertheless be published by the unregulated press. If, 
for example, a local broadcast station chooses not to cover a debate 
between two prominent mayoral candidates because of equal time 
obligations, then the public will still be informed of the event by the 
local newspaper. Second, a partial scheme offers some assurance 
that governmental use of the regulatory authority to bludgeon the 
press into an official line will not suppress the truth. If, for example, 
the Washington Post had curtailed its Watergate investigations to 
ward off what it might reasonably have perceived to be governmental 
pressure to have the licenses of its subsidiary radio stations revoked, 
other newspapers free of governmental entanglements, such as the 
98. As one commentator has argued: 
Any widespread governmental action is likely to produce unexpected results. 
England, early in the eighteenth century, sought to strengthen her long-standing 
alliance with Portugal by admitting Portuguese wines at a very low rate of duty, 
This encouraged the drinking of port rather than French claret. The result was 
to afflict two centuries of Englishmen with gout . . • . Similar surprises can 
take place when the government concerns itself with communications industries, 
2 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 475. Perhaps an example of an unforeseen effect of 
broadcast regulation is the apparent political abuse surrounding the fairness doctrine. 
See F. Friendly, What's Fair on the Air? N.Y. Times Magazine, March 30, 1975, 
at 11. Professor Friendly charges, inter alia, that during the early 1960s officers of 
the Democratic National Committee organized and funded "private" organizations 
that would demand of radio and television stations an opportunity to reply to any 
coverage of right-wing positions in order to discourage media coverage of anti-admin-
istration viewpoints. 
99. 2 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 699-700. 
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New York Times, would still have continued the investigation. 
Finally, such a system gives some assurance that the pressures for 
and effects of harmful regulation will be cushioned. If, for example, 
a Vice-President were to urge much more vigorous access regulation 
in order to ward off criticism of the President, and as a result the 
regulated sector were to tone down its criticism, the unregulated 
press would remain active. 
Restricting regulation to only a part of the press, however, offers 
more than a check against these costs. It provides, again through 
the presence of the unregulated media, a beneficial tension within 
the system. The unregulated sector can operate to minimize the 
three costs of regulation. Consider, for example, the chilling effect 
problem. The publication of news in the unregulated press serves 
as a competitive prod to the regulated press to publish what it might 
otherwise omit.100 Thus, broadcasters may initially have been 
reluctant to cover Watergate events because of fears of official 
reprisals and access obligations, but a decision not to cover the story 
would have been impossible once the print media began exploiting 
it, 101 
The most significant aspect of a partial regulatory scheme, how-
ever, is that it preserves a benchmark-an important link with our 
constitutional traditions as the Court permits experimentation with 
regulation. The continuing link with traditional first amendment 
theory conveys the message that old principles have not been 
abandoned, and it forces every departure to be more carefully 
scrutinized and justified. The message is one of adjustment rather 
than wholesale revision.102 
One of the more interesting features of our experience with 
broadcast regulation has been the absence of egregious abuses of 
power by the FCC. The Commission has, on the whole, been 
extraordinarily circumspect in the exercise of its powers.108 It is 
100. Cf. E. EPSTEIN, supra note 39, at 150. 
101. It is also likely that the principles represented by the regulations themselves 
will have an effect throughout the entire media system. Representing the public's 
pronouncement of proper journalistic behavior, the principles may over time filter in-
to the unregulated sphere, in much the same way that we occasionally see the con-
stitutional due process requirements voluntarily adopted by private institutions. Thus, 
under a partial regulatOI1' system a fruitful symbiotic relationship may be expected 
to develop. 
102. The process resembles that which is observed in other areas of constitutional 
law, for example, the applicability of criminal procedure rules to the juvenile justice 
system. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
103. 1 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 11-12; 2 id. at 476-77; Kalven, supra note 
21, at 18, 19-20. The only area, it seems, where the Commission can perhaps be 
charged with having seriously ignored important free speech interests is indecent 
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reasonable to assume that this self-restraint is explained in large part 
by the constant juxtaposition of the autonomous print media, repre-
senting our continued respect for the ideal of a free press, against 
the regulated broadcasting media. By preserving the unregulated 
print media, the benchmark against which the reform must continu-
ally be measured, even if not explicitly, the Court has furnished a 
built-in restraint against excesses in regulation. Those representing 
the interests _of broadcasters have been able to point to the practices 
of the print media as concrete illustrations of traditional constitutional 
principles rather than to some abstract principle of freedom of the 
press, thus making more explicit any departure from nonregulation. 
The effect of this process can be readily observed in more recent 
court decisions, where frequent references to the print media 
demonstrate the force of the newspaper analogy.104 
In an -article on broadcast regulation written in 1967, Professor 
Kalven observed that "D]aw . . . is determined by a choice be-
tween competing analogies."105 What had been "sorely needed" 
in the broadcasting area was "the competing analogy to set against 
the claims for control."106 There had never been "a precedent 
setting the outer boundaries of [FCC] control . . . ."107 The 
absence of an explicit limit on Commission authority has been unfor-
tunate, but the problem has been less significant than it otherwise 
would be precisely because the unregulated print media has provided 
a "competing analogy." 
It is from this perspective that the Miami Herald decision begins 
to make some sense. On the surface, the decision seems singularly 
inattentive to the parallel broadcasting cases, yet in fact it speaks 
directly to them. Red Lion had given the impression that editorial 
rights were to be subordinated to the "public's right to hear." It 
spawned a political and legal movement, spearheaded by Professor 
Jerome Barron,108 plaintiffs counsel in Miami Herald, for more 
speech. See, e.g., In re Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964); In re WUHY-
FM Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970). See Kalven, supra note 21, 
at 18. 
104. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 
412 U.S. 94 (1973); National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 
1914), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976). 
105. Kalven, supra note 21, at 38. 
106. Id. 
101. Id. at 37. 
108. See Barron, supra note 8; Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of 
Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969); Barron, Access-The Only 
Choice for the Media?, 48 TEx. L. REv. 766 (1970). Other articles on access are 
collected in Lange, supra note 5, at 2 n.5. 
The movement for a first amendment right of access to the broadcast media has 
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extensive regulation. In its reaffirmation of fundamental first 
amendment princip\es, the Miami Herald Court's opinion urges 
caution and restraint, and sharply limits regulatory reform. To be 
sure, the opinion represents a lowpoint in judicial craftsmanship, but 
it is nevertheless explicable. · 
It must be admitted that the proposed partial theory of regulation 
is unique in its specific formulation. Nowhere else has the Court 
interpreted the Constitution to allow Congress such a discretionary 
regulatory role. The theory is, however, no less valid for this reason. 
It can. satisfy -the test of legitimacy applied to new constitutional pro-
nouncements. As discussed above, the Court is able to present 
reasoned arguments for both allowing regulation and restricting it as 
a way to further the purposes and values underlying the first amend-
ment. 
It has long been recognized that the Constitution is not a static 
instrument. Old constitutional principles are continually being dis-
carded or revised as they are discovered to be ineffective in protect-
ing fundamental values or to hamstring unduly the achievement of 
legitimate social aims; new principles are continually being devised 
to meet the exigencies of an ever-changing reality. A part of this 
process, as the access question demonstrates, involves deciding to 
what extent new principles are to overtake traditional approaches. 
It is a major part of the Court's most vital function of carrying for-
ward and reinterpreting constitutional values in light of changed 
circumstances. 
The theory of partial regulation mandates, in effect, a system in 
which the burdens of regulation will be allocated unequally among 
the various institutions of the press. Those associated with the 
institution that Congress chooses to regulate may claim that it is 
unfair for them to bear the burdens of regulation when their similarly 
situated counterparts do not. Their claim would be that the 
scheme of classification is "underinclusive." This claim of unequal 
treatment may be a factor to be considered in deciding whether 
to mandate a partial system, but it ought not be determina-
tive for several reasons. First, courts and commentators generally 
give greater constitutional leeway to an underinclusive rather than 
an "overinclusive" approach to a general problem, since in under-
inclusive classifications "all who are inchided in the class are at least 
tainted by the mischief at which the law aims . . . while over-inclu-
sive classifications reach out to the innocent bystander, the hapless 
been arrested by the Court's decision in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Dem-
ocratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
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victim of circumstances or association."109 Second, the trait that 
defines the class would not be the content of speech and it would 
not reflect an official animus against a particular group of people 
because it would be directed at institutions and not individuals. That 
is, the classifying trait would be the neutral factor of technology, and 
not a suspect factor such as race. This means that those individuals 
indirectly affected would be able to shift to the unregulated media 
and escape the burden imposed should they find it offensive, and 
that the opportunity for government to pursue solely political or 
discriminatory purposes under the guise of the first amendment is 
minimized. 
In seeking to advance first amendment goals, the Court should 
not be precluded from deciding on a rational basis to limit congres-
sional powers of regulation. There may be more than one claim to 
"equality" to be considered. Those persons excluded from public 
debate because of private ownership also have a claim to "equality" 
in the sense of obtaining an equal opportunity to speak.110 If a full 
restructuring of the press to accommodate •those claims is too danger-
ous, then the Court must balance the interests of those excluded from 
the media against the interests of those members of the press whom 
Congress will ultimately select to bear the burden of regulation in 
a partial system. Phrased somewhat differently, it is the first amend-
ment itself that justifies this differential treatment of mass communi-
cation technologies. 
The analysis of Red Lion and Miami Herald, therefore, demon-
strates the need to maintain a partial regulatory structure for its own 
sake. What the Court has never fully appreciated is that the very 
similarity of the two major branches of the mass media provides a 
rationale for treating them differently. By permitting different treat-
ment of the two institutions, the Court can facilitate realization of 
the b_enefits of two distinct constitutional values, both of which ought 
to be fostered: access in a highly concentrated press and minimal 
governmental intervention. Neither side of the access controversy 
emerges victorious. The Court has imposed a compromise-a com-
promise, however, not based on notions of expediency, but rather 
on a reasoned, and principled, accommodation of competing first 
amendment values. 
There is, it is true, something to be said in favor of limiting legis-
109. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF, L. 
REV, 341, 351 (1949). 
110. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U, 
Cm. L. REv. 20, 43-52 (1975). 
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lative experimentation with access to the electronic media and pre-
cluding Congress from choosing any segment of the mass media to 
regulate. This is a product of the different treatment long accorded 
broadcasting: What seems possible in broadcasting seems unthink-
able for newspapers. It is, however, unwise to maintain separate 
traditions for separate branches of 1:he media; it is, in the end, counter-
productive to first amendment interests. Instead, the Court ought 
to acknowledge broadcasters as full-fledged participants in our first 
amendment traditions and yet permit Congress to engage in some 
experimentation with press freedom to facilitate public access, allow-
ing Congress to choose the medium to be regulated. This means, 
of course, that eventually the legislative branch may shift the target of 
its regulatory scheme to other segments of the media, provided it 
, abandons its earlier target. Thus, it ought theoretically to be 
possible for Congress to abandon its regulation of the electronic 
media and choose instead to provide access within the confines of 
the newspaper industry. The extent to which it ought to be able 
to regulate the print media is problematical. The answer to that 
question, however, must ultimately depend on a contemporary evalu-
ation of the factors that justify partial regulation. 
ill. A CONSTITUTIONAL AsSESSMENT OF CABLE TECHNOLOGY 
Madame Sosotris, famous clairvoyante, had a bad cold .... 111 
An interpretation of the first amendment that permits Congress 
to impose access regulation, but only within a limited segment of the 
press, has important implications for the emerging technology of 
cable television. It is frequently argued that, since Red Lion pred-
icated its approval of access regulation upon the limited channel 
space of the electromagnetic spectrum, the shift to the virtually 
unbounded channel capacity of coaxial cables will eliminate the con-
stitutional justification for regulation.112 This argument, however, 
111. T.S. Eliot, The Waste lAnd, THE DIAL (Nov. 1922). 
112. See, e.g., Note, Cable Television and the First Amendment, 71 COLUM. L, 
REV. 1008 (1971); Note, The Proposed Cable Communications Act of 1975: A Rec-
ommendation for Comprehensive Regulation, 1915 DUKE LJ. 93, 112-13. 
Similar thinking appears to underlie the 1974 report of the Cabinet Committee 
on Cable Communications, which recommended the immediate end of access regula-
tion with respect to cablecasting. THE CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COMMUNI-
CATIONS, REPORT TO nm PRESIDENT 37-38 (1974). The Office of Telecommunica-
tions Policy (OTP) has prepared legislation embodying this and other policies for 
submission to Congress. Section 401 of the Proposed Act provides as follows: 
No executive agency of the United States . . . and no State or political subdivi-
sion or agency thereof • . . shall: 
(a) require or prohibit program originations by a cable operator or channel 
programmer, or impose upon such operator or programmer any restrictions or 
38 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:1 
misconceives the scarcity rationale as the tru~, or at least the only, 
explanation for the disparate treatment of the electronic media. A 
theory of partial regulation better explains Red Lion and Miami 
Herald, and that thesis would permit access regulation within tele-
vision even if there were an unlimited number of channels. 
That is not to say that the cable technology may not affect the 
existing structure of the television industry, and hence congressional 
perception of the urgency of regulation. By increasing the available 
number of channels, thereby easing the costs of entry into the tele-
vision market, cable may create a much more atomized system of 
programming with each channel claiming only a relatively small por-
tion of the viewing audience.113 It is even possible that the 
increased competition could result in the breakdown of the presently 
gargantuan networks. 
It is not at all certain that this will be the result. Indeed there 
are good reasons for thinking that the present structure will remain 
largely unchanged for the foreseeable future.114 In any case, it is 
virtually impossible at this time to predict precisely what transforma-
tion, if any, will occur, because it is difficult to determine what eco-
nomic advantages present broadcasters will have acquired, the extent 
to which audience tastes will change or remain the same, and the 
interplay of a host of other factors that 'will undoubtedly play a role. 
The potential of cable television to increase substantially the 
number of competing television outlets, however, should not change 
obligations affecting the content of such program originations, including rights 
of response by any person, opportunities for appearances by candidates for pub-
lic office, or requirements for balance and objectivity . • • • 
For commentary on the proposed bill, see Note, 1975 DUKE L.J. 93, supra. The pres-
ent status of the bill is uncertain. It has thus far failed to pass the executive clear-
ance process, and the OTP is studying various objections raised against the bill. It 
is unclear what the change in administration portends for the proposed legislation. 
Instead of using the circumscribed electromagnetic spectrum as a means of trans-
mitting television signals, cable television relies on coaxial cables laid underground 
or strung aboveground like telephone wires. No physical law limits the number of 
cables that can be connected. Thus, while the available frequencies in the VHF por-
tion of the spectrum permit only 12 channels, cable can carry as many as 80 chan-
nels. Through interconnection devices and the use of satellites, the potential exists 
for a vastly expanded national and local network of television channels. Broadcast-
ing as a mode of transmission could become obsolete. For a detailed discussion of 
the nature and uses of coaxial cable, see THE SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMU• 
NICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF .ABuNoANCE 11-16 (1971) (herein-
after SLOAN REPORT). It is important to realize, however, that cable bas not yet de-
veloped to this stage. Cable systems presently reach only approximately 12.5 per 
cent of the nation's television households and offer between 8 and 12 channels. See 
BROADCASTING, CABLE SoURCEBOOK 1975, at 5. 
113. See, e.g., R. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION ( 1972). 
114. See, e.g., SLOAN REPORT 78-81, 118, 169; LaPierre, Cable Television and 
the Promise of Programming Diversity, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 25, 119-24 (1973). 
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.the constitutional determination permitting Congress to impose 
access regulation on television. Even if eventually there are ten 
channels more or less evenly dividing the nation's audience, a rather 
remote possibility, Congress ought still to be permitted to provide 
that the opportunity to reach the television audience will not depend 
entirely on private ownership. As is true now, the government 
should be able in one forum to balance ,the freedom of press inter-
ests of those owning established channels of communication against 
the interests of those effectively excluded from major avenues of 
communication. 
Nevertheless, cable technology does me~ that a legislative 
crossroad has been reached on the matter of access regulation. The 
emergence of cable makes more possible than ever before reliance 
on the interplay of private interests to assure an effective market-
place of ideas. As a result, cable offers a new context in which to 
rethink questions relating to the scope and types of access regulation. 
It may be thought wiser, for example, to limit regulation to selected 
mass audience channels than to impose access regulation throughout 
television. Certain types of access regulation, moreover, may be 
considered either more or less appropriate than they were previously. 
Furthermore, the desirability of avoiding certain forms of access 
regulation that might affect the development of cable may be 
affirmed. A broad application of the fairness doctrine, for example, 
could inhibit the entry of programmers who desired to program with 
a strong ideological bias aimed at a limited and politically homogene-
ous audience. While this has been a cost of regulation in the past, 
its dimensions have been much more confined because the number 
of potential entrants so affected was much smaller. 
Cable, therefore, raises important questions for the current regu-
latory scheme. Currently, it is the FCC that provides answers to 
these questions. The Commission has chosen to impose access 
regulation within a cable, although thus far only on channels originat-
ing with the cable owner.115 Whether it will choose to apply access 
115. In 1972, the Commission after several years of study announced a highly 
elaborate and intricate body of regulations covering cable television reflecting a shift 
in Commission attitude from containment of cable to mild encouragement. FCC, 
CABLE TELEVISION REPORT AND ORDER ON RULES AND REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO 
CATV SYSTEMS, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972), stays denied, 34 F.C.C.2d 165, 170, 172, 
174, 176, 178, 180, reconsideration denied, 36 F.C.C.2d 326. See LaPierre, supra 
note 114, at 87. 
The most significant provisions are those that relate to the potential expansion 
of the total number of television channels available. Under the present regulations, 
cable systems must have a minimum capacity of 20 channels. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (a) 
(1) (1975). For each broadcast signal carried, the operator must make available one 
channel for nonbroadcast programming. 47 C.F.R. 76.251(a)(2) (1975). Of the 
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regulation to leased channels operated by independent programmers 
is still uncertain. 
The question likely to confront the Court in the near future is 
whether the Commission has the statutory authority under the Com-
munications Act of 1934 to impose access regulation on cable televi-
sion. When that case does arise, the Court ought to rule against 
the Commission for at least two reasons. First, given the potential 
of cable technology to alter significantly the television medium, 
together with the important first amendment interests at stake in the 
access question, the .Court should find that the imposition of access 
regulation on cable is beyond the scope of the Communications Act. 
The access problems that brought about the remedial efforts of the 
1934 Act are not comparable to those in cable technology. Second, 
the history of the Commission's treatment of cable does not inspire 
confidence in its judgments in this area. There is considerable evi-
dence that the Commission has been more concerned with protecting 
the economic interests of conventional broadcasters than with fully 
exploiting the resources of cable technology.116 Thus, the Court 
ought to require Congress to make the decision on access in the first 
instance. 
This approach to the question of access regulation in cable is not 
precluded by the Court's decision on. two occasions upholding the 
authority of the Commission under the Communications Act to 
impose various regulations on cable. The question whether the 
Commission has the power to regulate cable at all is separate from 
the question whether it has the authority to issue a particular rule. 
For our purposes, it is significant that neither of the Court's cable 
decisions involved an issue as important from a first amendment per-
spective as that of access regulation. Further, in both cases the 
Court seemed to recognize the need for congressional reevaluation 
of the need for regulating cable. In United States v. Southwestern 
Cable Co.,111 its first cable decision, the Court approved FCC 
latter channels, one each must be available for use by the public on a first-come first-
served basis, 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(4) (1975), by educational authorities, 47 C.F.R. 
§ 76.251(a)(5) (1975), and by local government, 47 C.F.R. § 76.25l(a)(6) (1975), 
and the remainder must be open for lease on a common carrier basis to independent 
programmers, 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(7) (1975). The rules further provide that the 
equal time and fairness doctrine rules are applicable to all origination cablecasts. 47 
C.F.R. §§ 76.205, 76.209 (1975). Other limitations relating to lotteries, obscenity, 
and sponsorship identification, which are regularly imposed on broadcasters, are also 
extended to cablecasters. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.213, 76.215, 76.221 (1975). 
The Commission's future regulatory role with respect to cable is, apparently, still 
a matter of considerable doubt within the agency. See Price, Requiem for the Wired 
Nation: Cable Rulemaking at the F.C.C., 61 VA. L. REv. 541, 544 (1975). 
116. See, e.g., LaPierre, supra note 114. 
117. 392 U.S. 157 (1968). 
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action under the Commission's "local carriage" rule, 118 which for-
bade certain cable systems from importing broadcast signals without 
Commission approval, and thereby served to protect the market of 
local broadcasters. The Court, speaking of a need to provide for 
the "orderly development" of an appropriate system of local televi-
sion broadcasting, 119 upheld the rule as "reasonably ancillary to the 
effective performance of the Commission's responsibilities for the 
regulation of television broadcasting. "120 
In a subsequent decision in United States v. Midwest Video 
· Corp., 121 the Court considered the Commission's "program origina-
tion" rule requiring nonbroadcast programming on some cable sys-
tems. The rule provided that "no CATV [cable] system having 
3,500 or more subscribers shall carry the signal of any television 
broadcast station unless the system also operates to a significant 
extent as a local outlet by cablecasting and has available facilities 
for local production and presentation of programs other than auto-
mated services."122 The Court was deeply divided on the issue of 
the statutory validity of the rule. In finding the regulation consistent 
with the "public interest" and thus within the power of the Commis-
sion, Justice Brennan, representing a plurality of four justices, said: 
The effect of the regulation, after all, is to assure that in the retrans-
mission of broadcast signals viewers are provided suitably diversified 
programming-the same objective underlying regulations sustained in 
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States . .. , as well as the local-
carriage rule reviewed in Southwestern and subsequently upheld.128 
A dissenting opinion joined by four justices argued that the regula-
tion was invalid on the ground that the Communications Act nowhere 
accorded the FCC the power to compel anyone "to enter the 
broadcasting field."124 With obvious reluctance, Chief Justice Bur-
ger cast the deciding vote for the Commission but observed that the 
118. The regulation as quoted in the Court's opinion provided that 
[n]o CATV system operating in a community within the predicted Grade A con-
tour of a television broadcast station in the 100 largest television markets shall 
extend the signal of a television broadcast station beyond the Grade B contour 
of that station, except upon a showing approved by the Commission that such 
extension would be consistent with the public interest, and specifically the estab-
lishment and healthy maintenance of television broadcast service in the area. 
392 U.S. 157, f59 n.2. , 
119. 392 U.S. at 177. 
120. 392 U.S. at 178. 
121. 406 U.S. ·649 (1972). 
122. 47 C.F.R. § 74.llll(a), revised as 47 C.F.R. § 76.201(a) (1973). This 
regulation was suspended for most of its life and then abandoned by the Commission 
in 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 43,302 (1974). 
123. 406 U.S. at 649, 669. 
124. 406 U.S. at 677, 679 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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"almost explosive development of CATV suggests the need of a 
comprehensive re-examination of the statutory scheme as it relates 
to this new development, so that the basic policies are considered by 
Congress and not left entirely to the Commission and the courts."126 
As the Commission seeks to extend its authority over cable tele-
vision, -the Court ought to be sensitive to the need for congressional 
guidance in an area that so plainly involves first amendment inter-
ests.126 The suggestion of Chief Justice Burger should be the basis 
for decision. A considered legislative judgment on matters relating 
to access regulation in cable television is important and overdue, but 
it should also be recognized that this is an appropriate juncture to 
pause and reassess the costs and benefits of the entire experiment. 
Most importantly, perhaps cable offers the Court an appropriate 
occasion for discarding the shibboleth of the scarcity rationale. The 
Court should begin the process of defining a rationale for regulation 
that recognizes the limited power of Congress to impose access regu-
lation within the mass media. At the same time the Court can 
openly recognize the link between broadcasting and our constitu-
tional traditions and begin to create a heightened sensitivity to the 
first amendment rights of broadcasters. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
What appears on the surface to be the paradox of Red Lion and 
Miami Herald turns out on close inspection to be a rationally defen-
sible regime. The different treatment accorded the broadcasting 
and print media is an especially intriguing illustration of the imple-
mentation of new first amendment principles. The substance of the 
constitutional solution that has been devised, or, more accurately, to 
which the decisions point, is both acceptable and sound. In the end, 
it is the first amendment itself that requires different treatment of 
these institutions, accommodating both the will of the legislature to 
participate in the realization. of first amendment goals and the role 
of the Court as the ultimate guarantor of those goals: The impact 
of a new technology like cable is not so much that it alters the accom-
modation, but that it permits the Court to take a fresh and unblinking 
view of it. 
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